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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Forty-one-year-old Larry Lee James Stadtmiller was charged with one count of 
felony sexual abuse of a minor child under sixteen years of age. Pursuant to an oral 
plea agreement, Mr. Stadtmiller attempted to enter a guilty plea to an amended charge 
of felony injury to a child, but the district court rejected that first attempted Alford plea.1 
He then attempted again to plead guilty to the amended charge as part of a written plea 
agreement, but the district court again refused to accept his Alford plea. After a jury 
trial, the jury found Mr. Stadtmiller guilty of the original charge of sexual abuse of a 
minor child. The district court imposed a unified sentence of nine years, with three 
years fixed. 
On appeal, Mr. Stadtmiller asserts that the district court abused its discretion 
when it rejected his first attempted Alford plea. He also asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Lori Esquivel reported to the Grangeville Police Department that her ten-year-old 
daughter, K.E., has been sexually assaulted. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), p.1.) Ms. Esquivel stated that K.E. had been staying with Stacey 
Ruzicka. (PSI, p.1.) Mr. Ruzicka had helped raise K.E., although he was not her 
biological father. (PSI, p.1.) Ms. Esquivel reported that K.E. telephoned her and stated 
that Mr. Ruzicka's roommate, Mr. Stadtmiller, had touched her "privates" the night 
before. (PSI, p.1.) 
1 See Norlh Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Officer Andy Beene subsequently contacted Mr. Ruzicka and K.E. (PSI, p.2.) 
Mr. Ruzicka confirmed that Mr. Stadtmiller was his roommate. (PSI, p.2.) K.E. stated 
that, on the night of the incident, she had been asleep on the couch in Mr. Ruzicka's 
living room, with her sister asleep on a nearby reclining chair. (PSI, p.2.) According to 
K.E., Mr. Stadtmiller came into the house, covered K.E. and her sister with blankets, 
and then sat down on the couch next to her. (PSI, p.2.) K.E. reported that 
Mr. Stadtmiller placed her legs on top of his legs, and then touched her all over her 
body. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Stadtmiller reportedly touched her breasts, and then rubbed her 
vaginal area. (PSI, p.2.) K.E. also stated that Mr. Stadtmiller tried to open her legs, and 
that she kept kicking at him. (PSI, p.2.) K.E. got up to use the bathroom, and then told 
Mr. Ruzicka what had just happened. (PSI, p.2.) When Mr. Ruzicka went to the living 
room, Mr. Stadtmiller was reportedly gone. (PSI, p.2.) 
Officer Beene then contacted Mr. Stadtmiller, who was in the camper in front of 
Mr. Ruzicka's house. (PSI, p.2.) When asked what had happened the night before, 
Mr. Stadtmiller stated nothing had happened. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Stadtmiller reported that 
he returned to the house from a bar soon after midnight, went into the house for a glass 
of water and some M&Ms, and then went outside to the camper to go to bed. (PSI, p.2.) 
After Officer Beene explained the accusation K.E. had made, Mr. Stadtmiller stated that 
K.E. had been asleep on the couch, and that he did not touch her or sit down next to 
her. (PSI, p.2.) 
As a result of the investigation, Mr. Stadtmiller was arrested. (PSI, p.2.) He was 
initially charged with one count of sexual abuse of a minor child under sixteen years of 
age, felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1506(b). (R., pp.6-7.) Mr. Stadtmiller 
entered a not guilty plea to the charge. (R, p.19.) 
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Later, the State informed the district court that the parties had reached an oral 
plea agreement, whereby Mr. Stadtmiller would plead guilty to an amended charge of 
one count of felony injury to a child. (R., p.30.) The district court granted the motion to 
amend the charge to injury to a child. (R., p.30.) After Mr. Stadtmiller entered a guilty 
plea to the amended charge, the district court examined him regarding the charge. 
(R., p.31.) The district court then rejected this first attempted Alford plea, stating that it 
could not accept the plea as an Alford plea because Mr. Stadtmiller had not been under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol to the point where he could not remember his actions, 
and because he did not admit any guilt. (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.18, L.4 - p.30, L.24.) 
The following day, the parties submitted a written Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (f)(1 )(C), 
(f)(4) plea agreement. (R., p.32.) Pursuant to the written plea agreement, 
Mr. Stadtmiller would plead guilty to an amended charge of injury to a child, felony, in 
violation of I.C. § 18-1501. (R., p.34.) The parties agreed to recommend that the 
district court place Mr. Stadtmiller on a period of supervised probation. (R., pp.34-35.) 
Mr. Stadtmiller then entered a plea of guilty to the amended charge of injury to a child. 
(R., p.32.) The district court ordered a PSI, substance abuse evaluation, and 
psychosexual evaluation. (R., p.32.) The district court indicated that it would decide 
whether to accept the written plea agreement after it received the PSI and evaluations. 
(See Tr., July 19, 2012, p.36, Ls.17-22.) 
The district court subsequently rejected the written plea agreement. (R., p.46.) 
The district court rejected this second plea agreement because it determined that 
Mr. Stadtmiller still did not believe that he had done anything wrong. (Tr., July 19, 2012, 
p.37, Ls.2-16.) Additionally, the district court rejected the written plea agreement 
because it called for supervised probation, which would involve some form of 
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counseling. (Tr., July 19, 2012, p.37, Ls.17-20.) The district court determined that 
because counseling would require Mr. Stadtmiller to admit to wrongdoing, and 
Mr. Stadtmiller did not think he had done anything wrong, it would be impossible for him 
to complete counseling. (Tr., July 19, 2012, p.37, L.19 - p.38, L.2.) Thus, the district 
court also rejected the second plea agreement because it determined that probation 
would not be viable. (Tr., July 19, 2012, p.38, L.2.) The district court gave the State 
time to decide whether it wanted to proceed on the injury to a child charge, or instead 
request that the charge be amended back to sexual abuse of a minor child. 
(Tr., July 19, 2012, p.38, L.4 - p.39, L.23.) In either event, the district court would 
withdraw Mr. Stadtmiller's guilty plea and enter a not guilty plea to the charge. 
(Tr., July 19, 2012, p.39, Ls.15-18.) 
The State then filed a motion to amend the charge to reflect the original charge of 
one count of sexual abuse of a minor child. (R., pp.50-51.) The district court granted 
the motion to amend the charge to sexual abuse of a minor child. (R., pp.52-54.) 
The district court subsequently held a jury trial. (R., pp.64-69.) The jury found 
Mr. Stadtmiller guilty of sexual abuse of a minor child. (R., p.63.) The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of nine years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.72, 75-77.) 
Mr. Stadtmiller then filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.79-81.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first 
attempted Alford plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
nine years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Stadtmiller following his conviction 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's First 
Attempted Alford Plea 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Stadtmiller asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it rejected 
his first attempted Alford plea, because the district court did not act consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to whether to accept an Alford plea. The district court 
rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted Alford plea because he did not admit any guilt 
and because he had not been under the influence of drugs or alcohol to the point where 
he did not remember the incident. The district court determined that it categorically 
could not accept an Alford plea where the defendant does not admit any guilt, or where 
the defendant was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol to the point where he or 
she did not remember the incident at issue. 
However, the law states that a district court is within its discretion to accept an 
Alford plea where the defendant does not admit any guilt, if there is a strong factual 
basis for the plea and the defendant understands the nature of the charges. Thus, the 
district court here would have been within its discretion to accept Mr. Stadtmiller's Alford 
plea, because a strong factual basis for the plea existed, and Mr. Stadtmiller's 
statements during the plea colloquy showed that he understood the nature of the 
charge. The district court, by determining that it categorically could not accept an Alford 
plea where the defendant does not admit any guilt or was not too intoxicated to 
remember the incident at issue, did not act consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to accepting an Alford plea. Because the district court did not act 
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consistently with the applicable legal standards, it abused its discretion when it rejected 
Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted Alford plea. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently held "that a district court's refusal to 
accept an Alford guilty plea is reviewable for abuse of discretion." Schoger v. State, 148 
Idaho 622, 627 (2010). Determining whether a district court abused its discretion 
involves a three-part inquiry into (1) "whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue 
as one of discretion," (2) "whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it," and (3) "whether the trial court reached its discretion by an exercise of 
reason." Id. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because It Did Not Act Consistently With 
The Legal Standards Applicable To Accepting An Alford Plea 
In North Carolina v. Alford, the United States Supreme Court held that "[a]n 
individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to 
the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his 
participation in the acts constituting the crime." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 
37 (1970). The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized the validity of an Alford plea, 
holding that "as long as there is a strong factual basis for the plea, and the defendant 
understands the charges against him, a voluntary plea of guilty may be accepted by the 
court despite a continuing claim by the defendant that he is innocent." Sparrow v. State, 
102 Idaho 60, 61 (1981) (citing Alford, 400 U.S. 25). 
In Schoger, the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated "that there is a substantial body 
of Idaho case law demonstrating that Alford pleas may rightfully be accepted in 
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situations where the defendant asserts factual innocence." Schoger, 148 Idaho at 629 
n.4 (citing Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247 (2009), McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847 
(2004), State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003), State v. Leon, 142 Idaho 705 (Ct. App. 
2006), State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290 (Ct. App. 2003), State v. Wilson, 136 Idaho 771 
(Ct. App. 2001)). However, the district court here rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first 
attempted Alford plea because it determined that it categorically could not accept an 
Alford plea where the defendant does not admit any guilt or was not too intoxicated to 
remember the incident at issue. 
During the plea colloquy for the first attempted Alford plea, Mr. Stadtmiller told 
the district court that, on the night of the incident, he had consumed about eight beers at 
a bar, returned to Mr. Ruzicka's house with a friend's dog following him, and entered the 
house to make a meal and place the dog in a kennel. (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.21, L.8 -
p.24, L.22.) While Mr. Stadtmiller was in the house, he saw K.E. sleeping on the couch 
and her sister sleeping on the recliner. (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.23, L.9 - p.25, L.2.) He 
did not speak with either K.E. or her sister at that time. (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.24, Ls.2-
4.) He then went outside. (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.22, L.25.) When the dog's owner came 
by the house, Mr. Stadtmiller let him in the house to get the dog. (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, 
p.23, Ls.2-8, p.25, Ls.3-8.) He told the district court that, by that point, the children were 
gone. (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.23, Ls.4-8, p.25, Ls.7-8.) When the district court asked 
Mr. Stadtmiller what had happened between him and K.E., he stated that he only put a 
blanket and pillows on her or on the couch. (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.26, Ls.4-16.) 
The district court subsequently asked Mr. Stadtmiller, "So why are you thinking 
about pleading guilty?" (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.26, Ls.17-18.) Mr. Stadtmiller replied, 
"Due to the fact I was told that in a jury trial that it would probably go either way." 
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(Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.26, Ls.19-20.) Mr. Stadtmiller did not want a sexual offense (such 
as sexual abuse of a minor child, as opposed to an offense such as injury to a child that 
would not require sex offender registration)2 on his record, and he recognized that a trial 
might not go his way. (See Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.26, L.22 - p.27, L.8.) 
Then, the district court initially explained its rejection of Mr. Stadtmiller's first 
attempted Alford plea: 
Well, based on what you've said, Mr. Stadtmiller, I cannot accept your 
plea. It doesn't qualify as an Alford plea. You weren't so drunk you didn't 
remember what you did, and you haven't admitted any guilt as far as the 
offense goes. We're still set for trial on Monday morning at 9:00, and the 
motion to amend the complaint will be denied or withdrawn - or the motion 
won't be granted, I'll put it that way. But I can only accept the plea, 
number one, if you admit guilt, or number two, under certain 
circumstances where you're under the influence of drugs or alcohol to the 
point where you don't remember what happened. But you've examined 
the evidence and you think that a jury might find you guilty anyway. But 
clearly you remember everything that happened: Making a meal, doing 
lots of things, and you haven't admitted any guilt, and under the law I can't 
accept a plea of guilty if you aren't guilty .... 
(Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.27, L.10-p.28, L.1.) 
Mr. Stadtmiller then commented that "they [the State] said that I did, I guess, 
harm the child in a way." (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.28, L.4.) When the district court asked 
Mr. Stadtmiller to elaborate, he explained that he "bothered [K.E.] while she was 
sleeping" through "placing the blanket and pillow on her." (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.28, 
Ls.6-7, 9-10.) However, after further elaboration, the district court told Mr. Stadtmiller 
that, "If everything happened the way you say it [did] there isn't any crime," and 
2 See, e.g., Doe Iv. Doe II, 148 Idaho 713, 714 (2010) ("[The defendant] was arrested 
and charged with Internet Enticement of Children, a felony. The State later amended 
the charge to felony Injury to a Child, which avoided him having to register as a 
sex offender."). 
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Mr. Stadtmiller replied, "That's what I had thought." (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.28, L.11 -
p.29, L.16.) 
The district court stated that, "under those circumstances, like I say, you haven't 
admitted guilt as far as I can tell, and it isn't an Alford situation." (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, 
p.29, Ls.17-19.) The following exchange then occurred: 
[THE COURT:] There are elements that the State has to prove and 
that you would have to admit in order for me to accept your plea of guilty 
and-
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: I haven't heard anything so far that covers those 
elements and this, like I say, this isn't an Alford situation. You weren't 
drunk beyond the point where you can't remember or under the influence 
of drugs which you can't remember, which is what an Alford Plea is, or 
head injury or something like that. But based on everything you've said 
you haven't indicated that you have committed any crime. So, under 
those circumstances, like I say, I can't accept your plea of guilty. 
(Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.30, Ls.11-24.) In short, the district court determined that it 
categorically could not accept an Alford plea where the defendant does not admit 
any guilt or was not too intoxicated to remember the incident at issue, and thereby 
rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted Alford plea. 
By determining that it categorically could not accept an Alford plea where the 
defendant does not admit any guilt or was not too intoxicated to remember the incident 
at issue, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards 
when it rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted Alford plea. As discussed above, the 
United States Supreme Court has held that "[aJn individual accused of crime may 
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison 
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts 
constituting the crime." Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. Following Alford, the Idaho Supreme 
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Court has held that "as long as there is a strong factual basis for the plea, and the 
defendant understands the charges against him, a voluntary plea of guilty may be 
accepted by the court despite a continuing claim by the defendant that he is innocent." 
Sparrow, 102 Idaho at 61 (citing Alford, 400 U.S. 25). 
A district court may also accept an Alford plea where the defendant was not too 
intoxicated to remember the incident at issue. District courts have the discretion to 
accept Alford pleas in cases where the defendant was under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol to the point where the defendant did not remember the incident at issue. See, 
e.g., Steele v. State, 153 Idaho 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Steele asserted that he was 
unable to remember any of the alleged incidents as a result of heavy intoxication .... 
Steele agreed to plead guilty without admitting a factual basis for his guilty pursuant to 
[Alford]. The district court accepted Steele's Alford plea upon the State's recitation of 
the facts .... ") However, a district court may also accept an Alford plea where the 
defendant was not too intoxicated to remember the incident at issue, even if the 
defendant claims to be innocent, so long as there is a strong factual basis for the plea 
and the defendant understands the charges against him or her. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 
37; Sparrow, 102 Idaho at 61. 
Thus, a district court is within its discretion to accept an Alford plea in a case, 
such as the instant case, where the defendant does not admit any guilt. See Schoger, 
148 Idaho at 629 n.4. The district court in this case would have been within its 
discretion to accept Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted Alford plea, because there was a 
strong factual basis for the plea and Mr. Stadtmiller understood the charge against him. 
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There was a strong factual basis for Mr. Stadtmiller's plea. Evidence presented 
by the State may provide the factual basis for an Alford plea. See Alford, 400 U.S. 
at 36-38. 
Here, the following exchange occurred between the district court and the State 
regarding the factual basis for the plea: 
THE COURT: ... with respect to the amended charge, that is the injury to 
a child, in general, what would the State's evidence be at trial? 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, it would [be] that the victim was 
sleeping on a couch at her father's home. Was awoken late at night. She 
alleges that Mr. Stadtmiller sat down next to her. Put her legs on top of 
his legs and then began to basically rub her with his hands, at one point 
attempting to touch her breasts outside her clothing, and then moved 
down to the vaginal area. She alleges he rubbed her in the vaginal area 
outside the clothing for about seven or eight seconds, and then she asked 
him to stop and he did. And she then reported that to her father who was 
in another room nearby, and she, State alleges, she is suffering mentally 
from that and did from the point that it happened, which would be the 
unjustifiable mental suffering. But that would be the State's evidence, 
Your Honor. 
(Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.12, L.20 - p.13, L.13.) Thus, the State's evidence provided a 
strong factual basis for the first attempted Alford plea. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 36-38. 
Additionally, Mr. Stadtmiller understood the charge against him. Defendants may 
be said to have understood the charges against them where they testified that they read 
the information and understood the charges in it, and there is no evidence that they had 
any serious deficiencies in their ability to speak English, intelligence, or education. See 
Sparrow, 102 Idaho at 61-62. 
During the plea colloquy in this case, the district court examined Mr. Stadtmiller 
as to his understanding of the felony injury to a child charge. (Tr, Apr. 25, 2012, p.15, 
L.6 - p.18, L.8.) The district court read the injury to a child charge before starting the 
examination. (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.7, L.18-p.8, L.16.) The district court later asked if 
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Mr. Stadtmiller understood the nature of the charge, if he had enough time to talk to his 
trial counsel, and if his trial counsel advised him to his satisfaction of his rights, possible 
defenses, and possible consequences if he were to plead guilty. (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, 
p.15, L.6- p.17, L.18.) Mr. Stadtmiller answered in the affirmative to those questions. 
(Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.15, L.8, p.17, Ls.7-18.) Further, Mr. Stadtmiller told the district 
court that he had never had a prescription for any psychotropic medication, and that he 
did not take any prescription drugs. (Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.17, Ls.1-6.) Mr. Stadtmiller 
did not evince any serious deficiencies with his ability to speak English, his intelligence, 
or his education. Thus, Mr. Stadtmiller's answers during the plea colloquy established 
that he understood the charge against him. Sparrow, 102 Idaho at 61-62. 
Because a strong factual basis existed for the plea, and Mr. Stadtmiller 
understood the charge against him, the district court would have been within its 
discretion to accept Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted Alford plea. However, the district 
court rejected the first Alford plea because it determined that it categorically could not 
accept an Alford plea where the defendant did not admit any guilt or was not too 
intoxicated to remember the incident at issue. ( See Tr., Apr. 25, 2012, p.30, Ls.11-24.) 
Thus, the district court did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable to 
accepting an Alford plea.3 
3 Mr. Stadtmiller would note that the applicable legal standards do not require a district 
court to accept an Alford plea where the defendant does not admit any guilt. In 
Schoger, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "no provision of Idaho law ... requires a 
court to accept a guilty plea." Schoger, 148 Idaho at 630. Schoger is distinguishable 
from the present case because the district court in Schoger determined that it would not 
accept the defendant's Alford plea after applying the applicable legal standards to the 
particular circumstances in that case, see id. at 628-30, while the district court here 
determined that it categorically could not accept Mr. Stadtmiller's Alford plea. 
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Because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal 
standards, it abused its discretion when it rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted 
Alford plea. See Schoger, 148 Idaho at 627. Thus, Mr. Stadtmiller's judgment of 
conviction should be vacated and his case should be remanded for the district court to 
reconsider his Alford plea. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Nine 
Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Stadtmiller Following His Conviction For 
Sexual Abuse Of A Minor Child 
A Introduction 
Mr. Stadtmiller asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed a unified sentence of nine years, with three years fixed, because the sentence, 
considering any view of the facts, is excessive. 
8. Standard Of Review 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Mr. Stadtmiller does not allege that his sentence exceeds the 
statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-1506(5). Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Stadtmiller must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
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is excessive considering any view of the facts. Jackson, 130 Idaho at 294. The 
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; 
and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. "In determining whether the 
sentencing court abused its discretion," the appellate court "review[s] all of the facts and 
circumstances of the case." Id. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because The Sentence Imposed Is 
Excessive Considering Any View Of The Facts 
Mr. Stadtmiller submits that the district court abused its discretion because the 
sentence imposed is excessive considering any view of the facts. The sentence 
imposed by the district court is excessive considering any view of the facts because the 
district court did not give adequate consideration to mitigating factors. 
Specifically, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Stadtmiller's 
substance abuse problems. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized substance 
abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a sentence to be excessive. See, 
e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral 
Summary (hereinafter, GRRS) attached to the PSI diagnosed Mr. Stadtmiller with 
"Alcohol Abuse." (GRRS, p.1; PSI, p.12.) Mr. Stadtmiller "self-reported symptoms 
sufficient to meet criteria for alcohol abuse." (GRRS, p.2.) He also reported "low to 
moderate substance use problems" in the ninety days prior to his GAIN-I evaluation. 
(GRRS, p.7.) In a letter to the district court, Mr. Stadtmiller's sister, Lisa Bond, wrote 
that Mr. Stadtmiller had struggled with alcoholism since he was in high school. 
(Sentencing Hearing Def. Ex. C, p.1.) 
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Unfortunately, many of Mr. Stadtmiller's issues with the law have stemmed from 
his substance abuse problems. The GRRS reported, "He stated that when he drinks, 
he tends to get in trouble with the law." (GRRS, p.12.) His prior criminal record 
includes an open container violation and a misdemeanor DUI. (PSI, pp.4-7). 
Additionally, while Mr. Stadtmiller was on release from jail for the instant offense, he 
was charged with criminal contempt and furnishing alcohol to a minor.4 (PSI, p.7.) He 
had reportedly been consuming alcohol and in contact with a minor, in violation of the 
conditions of his release. (PSI, p.7.) The minor reported that Mr. Stadtmiller had made 
sexual comments to her and furnished her with alcohol after a barbeque. (PSI, pp.7-8.) 
Mr. Stadtmiller was then charged and incarcerated. (PSI, p.8.) During the presentence 
interview for the instant case, Mr. Stadtmiller stated that he drank beer at the barbeque, 
but maintained that he did not provide alcohol to the minor or make any sexual 
comments to her. (PSI, p.8.) 
Mr. Stadtmiller's substance abuse also prompted many of the other offenses on 
his prior record. Ms. Bond wrote in her letter, "I watched Larry's alcoholism escalate to 
an unbelievable height and Larry was always in and out of jail for something stupid but 
most always involving alcohol." (Sentencing Hearing Def. Ex. C, p.1.) Similarly, at the 
sentencing hearing Mr. Stadtmiller told the district court "at least 80 percent of my 
misdemeanor convictions were due to alcohol." (Tr., Nov. 1, 2012, p.185, Ls.15-17.) 
4 According to the Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository entries for Idaho County Nos. 
CR 2012-52160 and CR 2012-52096, those charges were later dismissed on the motion 
of the prosecutor. See Idaho State Judiciary, Idaho Repository - Search by Party, 
https://www.idcourts.us/repository/partySearch.do (last viewed Aug. 5, 2013) (enter 
"Stadtmiller" under "Last Name" and select "Idaho County" under "County"; then, use 
the "Search" button, type the CAPTCHA characters as requested, and select the "Case 
History with ROAs"). 
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Mr. Stadtmiller now recognizes that he needs treatment for his substance abuse 
problems. Although Mr. Stadtmiller represented during the presentence investigation 
that he did not feel that he had a drinking problem (PSI, p.12), the GRRS reported that 
he "acknowledged problems related to alcohol or other drug use." (GRRS, p.6.) At the 
sentencing hearing, Mr. Stadtmiller told the district court, "I have had a lot of problems 
with alcohol." (Tr., Nov. 1, 2012, p.185, L.15.) He also stated, "since I've been 
incarcerated I've called many things about the alcohol treatment . . . I would like to seek 
alcohol treatment in any manner."5 (Tr., Nov. 1, 2012, p.186, Ls.15-19.) Mr. Stadtmiller 
explained that his arrest while he was on release from jail "just proves that I do have an 
alcohol problem." (Tr., Nov. 1, 2012, p.186, L.24 - p.187, L.1.) He had been sober for 
about four months at the time of sentencing, and told the district court that he was 
"asking for a chance to prove myself and get some sort of treatment, and hopefully this 
is, you know - I see myself in a different light being sober than I do, even just having a 
small amount of alcohol, and that's basically what it comes down to." (Tr., Nov. 1, 
2012, p.188, Ls.2-8.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Stadtmiller's substance abuse 
problems should have resulted in a lesser sentence. 
The district court also did not adequately consider Mr. Stadtmiller's own support 
of his family. Ms. Bond wrote in her letter that Mr. Stadtmiller had lived with her for a 
period of eleven years. (Sentencing Hearing Def. Ex. C, p.2.) During that time, 
Mr. Stadtmiller cut down on his drinking and helped watch Ms. Bond's children. 
5 While Mr. Stadtmiller wrote a letter (intercepted by the Idaho County Jail) to Will and 
Dorinda Hearn stating, "Me my self am just adding in the whole alcohol treatment thing 
Sunshine up the judges skirt," (Letter from Renee Behrens, Section Supervisor, Idaho 
Department of Correction, to the Honorable MJ Griffin, District Judge, Nov. 1, 2012), 
Mr. Stadtmiller told the district court that statement was in reference to an inside joke 
(Tr., Nov. 1, 2012, p.186, Ls.8-12). 
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(Sentencing Hearing Def. Ex. C., p.2.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Stadtmiller told 
the district court, "I've spent my life basically raising kids," an apparent reference to both 
Ms. Bond's children and his own three daughters. (See Tr., Nov. 1, 2012, p.187, L.25.) 
In her letter, Ms. Bond also stated that, "In 2011, I personally was diagnosed with 
an inoperable brain tumor after having a stroke and was given a life expectancy of 5 to 
7 years." (Sentencing Hearing Def. Ex. C., p.3.) She further stated that "[o]ur mother is 
82 years old now and also in failing health and I believe is too sick to travel in order to 
visit Larry." (Sentencing Hearing Def. Ex. C., p.3.) Ms. Bond asked the district court to 
"please send Larry to a rehab center and not to prison because I know that either he or I 
will not live long enough to see a life outside of prison and that my family including Larry 
does not deserve our lives to end that way." (Sentencing Hearing Def. Ex. C, p.3.) 
Adequate consideration of Mr. Stadtmiller's support for his family should have resulted 
in a lesser sentence. 
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating 
factors, Mr. Stadtmiller's sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. Thus, 
the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the sentence. Mr. Stadtmiller's 
sentence should be reduced. Alternatively, his case should be remanded to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Stadtmiller respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case for the district court to 
reconsider his Alford plea. Alternatively, Mr. Stadtmiller respectfully requests that this 
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand his case to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 2013. 
BEN PATRICK MCGREE 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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